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Abstract
The iterative consensus problem requires a set of processes or agents
with different initial values, to interact and update their states to even-
tually converge to a common value. Protocols solving iterative consensus
serve as building blocks in a variety of systems where distributed coor-
dination is required for load balancing, data aggregation, sensor fusion,
filtering, clock synchronization and platooning of autonomous vehicles.
In this paper, we introduce the private iterative consensus problem where
agents are required to converge while protecting the privacy of their ini-
tial values from honest but curious adversaries. Protecting the initial
states, in many applications, suffice to protect all subsequent states of the
individual participants.
First, we adapt the notion of differential privacy in this setting of
iterative computation. Next, we present a server-based and a completely
distributed randomized mechanism for solving private iterative consensus
with adversaries who can observe the messages as well as the internal
states of the server and a subset of the clients. Finally, we establish the
tradeoff between privacy and the accuracy of the proposed randomized
mechanism.
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of reaching agreement in a group iteratively
while preserving individual’s privacy. The setup consists of N agents, each with
some initial information modeled as the valuation of a variable. The problem
requires the agents to interact with each other and update their internal states,
so that eventually they all converge to a common decision or value. This agree-
ment to a common decision can then be used for coordinating the actions of
the participating agents. Indeed, this iterative consensus has been used as a
building block for designing a variety of distributed coordination protocols for
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load balancing [6, 23], filtering and sensor fusion [16, 24], clock synchronization,
and flocking [4, 18, 12, 19, 13], to name a few.
A natural, synchronous, and widely studied consensus mechanism involves,
at each round, for every agent to update its state as a weighted average of
its own value with values of its neighboring agents. This update rule can be
expressed as x(t + 1) = Px(t), where x(t) is the vector of agent values and
P is a symmetric N × N matrix with Pij defining the communication weight
between agents i and j. It turns out that this class of consensus mechanisms1
converge to the average of the initial values of the agents and a measure of the
speed of convergence is given by the second largest eigenvalue in absolute value
of the matrix P . More general necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving
consensus with synchronous mechanisms, including cases where the matrix P
is time-varying, have been studied in [21, 17] (see the book for a complete
overview [14]). Sufficient conditions for achieving consensus with message delays
and losses has been developed in [22, 3] and more recently, a theorem prover-
based verification framework for these mechanisms has been presented in [15,
5]. Furthermore, stochastic variants of the convergence mechanism under the
presence of communication noises has been studied in [23, 11].
In this paper we study the private consensus problem which requires the
agents to preserve the privacy of their initial values from an adversary who
can see all the messages being exchanged, while also achieving convergence to
the average of the initial values. The notion of privacy used in this paper is
derived from the idea of differential privacy, first introduced in [8] (see [9] for
a survey) in the context of “one-shot” computations on statistical databases.
Roughly speaking, differential privacy ensures that the removal (or addition) of
a single participant from a database does not affect the output of any analysis
substantially . It follows that an adversary looking at the output of any analysis
cannot threaten to breach the privacy and security of individual participants.
In [10], the notion of differential privacy is expanded along two dimensions.
First, it included streaming and online computations in which the adversary can
look at the entire sequence of outputs from the analysis algorithm. Secondly,
it allowed the adversary to look at the internal state of the algorithm (Pan
privacy) in addition to the communication messages.
This work is motivated by closed-loop applications where the output of the
analysis is used as a feedback by the participating agents in updating their states.
As a starting point in this investigation, we use a client-server setup for iterative
consensus. The clients are the agents with private initial values. In each round,
the clients send some information to the server based on their current state, the
server updates its own state based on clients’ information and sends feedback to
the clients. Finally, the clients update their state according to some local control
law based on the server’s feedback. The clients require to converge, while their
initial values should be protected from any honest but curious adversary with
access to the messages (between the clients and the server) as well as the server’s
1We refrain from calling these mechanisms algorithms because they are designed to con-
verge and not to terminate.
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internal state. We call this the Synchronous Private Consensus (SPC) problem.
In many distributed control systems, protected initial information imply
protection of the current state. For example, consider a platoon of vehicles
which require to move as a group with the same speed, while keeping their
positions private. If the agents use a solution to the SPC problem for deciding
on the common speed, then their initial velocities as well as their positions will
be protected even if their initial positions and control laws are compromised.
In Section 3 we propose a randomized mechanism for solving the SPC prob-
lem. The key idea is to add a particular type of random noise to the clients’
messages to the server. Specifically, for a client with internal state θ(t) at round
t, the message it sends to the server is θ(t) + η(t) where η(t) is a random (real)
number chosen according to a Laplace distribution with a parameter that decays
geometrically with t. In contrast, the noise values added in [10] for implement-
ing an approximate online counter are always chosen from the same Laplace
distribution. The feedback y(t) provided by the server is the mean of the noisy
messages it receives. And, the clients update their states by taking a linear
combination of y(t) and their earlier state. This weighted average is an example
of a simple type of client dynamics.
In Section 4, we generalize the client-server mechanism to a distributed set-
ting where the adversary can access the messages and the states of a subset
of compromised clients. The mechanism guarantees differential privacy of the
good clients and we derive a sufficient condition for convergence based on the
communication pattern of the clients.
As randomization is used for achieving privacy, this mechanism guarantees
convergence to the average in a probabilistic sense: Given a probability b and a
radius r, we say that the mechanism is (b, r)-accurate if from any initial state,
with probability (1− b) the system converges to a value within r distance of the
average. In Section 5, we discuss the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy.
There are two parameters in the definition of the mechanism which can be
chosen to get different levels of privacy and accuracy. If these parameters are
tuned to obtain -differential privacy, then we show that the accuracy that can
be achieved is (b,O( 1

√
bN
). That is, the accuracy radius depends inversely on
privacy level () and the accuracy probability (1− b), and directly on √N .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
synchronous private consensus problem, and then formally define differential
privacy, convergence, and accuracy. In Sections 3 and 4, we present and analyze
the client-server and the distributed mechanisms for SPC. In Section 6, we
compare our work with existing research papers in this area. In Section 7, we
summarize our results and discuss possible future directions.
2 Preliminaries
For a natural number N ∈ N, we denote the set {1, . . . , N} by [N ]. For an
S-valued vector θ of length N , and i ∈ [N ], we denote the ith component by θi.
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The mechanisms presented in this paper rely on random real numbers drawn
according to the Laplace distribution. Lap(b) denotes the Laplace distribution
with probability density given by pL(x|b) = 12be−|x|/b. This distribution has
mean 0 and variance 2b2. For any x, y ∈ R, pL(x|b)pL(y|b) ≤ e
|x−y|
b .
2.1 Problem Statement
We state the synchronous private consensus (SPC) problem in the following set-
ting. The system consists of N clients with private initial values θ1(0), . . . , θN (0)
and one server . The clients and the server may have internal states and they
communicate over channels. In each round, there are four phases: First, the
clients send some messages to the server; next, the server performs computa-
tions to update its state; then it responds to the clients with some messages,
and finally, the clients smoothly update their own internal states based on the
response from the server.
Several vulnerabilities threaten to compromise the private initial values of
the clients: (1) An intruder can have full access to all the communication chan-
nels. That is, he can peek inside all the messages going back and forth between
he clients and the server. Furthermore, (2) the intruder can access the server’s
internal state.
Roughly, a randomized mechanism for the clients and the server solves the
synchronous private consensus problem if eventually all the clients converge to
the average of their initial values with high probability and it guarantees that
the intruder cannot learn about the initial private client values with any high
level of confidence. We proceed to precisely define accuracy, convergence, and
privacy.
Our definition of privacy is a modification of the notion of differential privacy
introduced in [10] in the context of streaming algorithms. Let Θ ⊆ R be the
domain of individual internal states and messages.
Definition 1 (Adjacency). Two vectors θ, θ′ ∈ ΘN are δ-adjacent, for some
δ ≥ 0, if there exists one i ∈ [N ], such that |θi − θ′i| ≤ δ and for all j 6= i,
θj = θ
′
j.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). Let ΘN ⊂ RN be the domain of global
state equipped with metric m(·, ·). Let X be the set of all possible message
sequences and Y be the set of all possible sequences of internal states of Alg .
A randomized mechanism preserves -differential privacy if for all sets X ′ ⊆ X
and Y ′ ⊆ Y , and for all pairs of δ-adjacent initial global states θ, θ′ ∈ ΘN
Pr[Alg(θ) ∈ (X ′, Y ′)] ≤ eδPr[Alg(θ′) ∈ (X ′, Y ′)].
We use the standard mean square notion of convergence which has been used
in the context of consensus protocols [11]. Let θi(t) ∈ R be the local states of
agent Ai at the beginning of round t. θi(0) denotes the secrete initial state of
Ai.
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Definition 3 (Convergence). A randomized mechanism is said to converge if
for any initial configuration, for any i, j ∈ [N ], limt→∞E[(θi(t)− θj(t))2] = 0,
where the expectation is over the coin-flips of the algorithm.
Definition 4 (Accuracy). For any initial state θ(0), b ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ R≥0
a randomized mechanism is said to achieve (b, r)-accuracy if every execution
starting from θ(0) converges to a state within r of 1N
∑
i θi(0), with probability
at least 1− b.
Our goal is to design a solution to the SPC problem that guaranteed to be
converge. In addition, for an adversary, looking at all a sequence of messages
passing through the channels as well as a sequence of internal states of the server
(and possibly some of the clients), the probability of executions corresponding
to adjacent initial local states and these sequences have to be related by the
Equation in Definition 3.
3 A Client-Server Mechanism and its Analysis
In this section, we present a randomized mechanism for solving the synchronous
private consensus problem. This mechanism has three parameters σ ∈ (0, 1), c
and q ∈ (0, 1). The mechanism is specified by the following client and server
actions which define the four phases of each round. Let T = {0} ∪ N be the
infinite time domain. At each round t ∈ T:
(i) Client i sends a message xi(t) = θi(t) + ηi(t) to the server, where ηi(t) is
a random noise generated from the distribution Lap(cqt).
(ii) The server updates its own state as the average of all client messages
y(t) = 1N
∑
i xi(t).
(iii) The server sends y(t) to all clients.
(iv) Client i updates its state by linearly interpolating between θi(t) and y(t)
with coefficient σ, that is,
θi(t+ 1) = (1− σ)θi(t) + σy(t). (1)
3.1 Analysis
For t ∈ T, let θ(t) = [θ1(t), . . . , θN (t)]T be the vector defining the state of the
clients at the beginning of round t. Similarly, η(t) and x(t) are vectors for
noise and messages. An execution of the mechanism is an infinite sequence
of the form α = θ(0), (η(0), x(0), y(0)), θ(1), (η(1), x(1), y(1)), . . .. Observe that
given a initial vector θ(0) and the sequence of noise vectors η(0), η(1), . . ., the
execution of the system is completely specified. That is, for all t ∈ T, it defines
the messages x(t), y(t), the internal states of the clients θ(t) and that of the
server y(t). Thus, for brevity we will sometimes write an execution α as an
infinite sequence of the form θ(0), η(0), θ(1), η(1), . . .. The prefix of α upto
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round T ∈ T is denoted by αT . We denote the set of possible executions from
θ(0) as Execsθ(0).
For a given execution α, the adversary can observe the subsequence of mes-
sages x(t), y(t) and the server’s state y(t). We denote this subsequence by
α ↓ (x, y). Hence, two executions α and α′ are indistinguishable to an adver-
sary if α ↓ (x, y) = α′ ↓ (x, y). For a set of observation sequnces Obs, the set of
all possible executions from θ(0) which correspond to some observation in Obs
is the set Execsθ(0),Obs
∆
= {α ∈ Execsθ(0)|α ↓ (X,Y ) ∈ Obs}. We restate the
definition of differential privacy in this context.
Definition 5 (Differential Privacy). A randomized mechanism preserves -
differential privacy if for any set of observation sequnces Obs, and any pairs
of δ-adjacent initial global states θ(0), θ′(0) ∈ ΘN
Pr[Execsθ(0),Obs] ≤ eδPr[Execsθ′(0),Obs]. (2)
Lemma 1 (Privacy). For q ∈ (1−σ, 1), the mechanism guarantees -differential
privacy with  = qc(q+σ−1) .
Proof. Let θ(0) and θ′(0) be arbitrary δ-adjacent initial global states. Without
loss of generality, we assume that for some k ∈ [N ], θk(0) = θ′k(0) + δ. Fix any
subset of observation sequences Obs. We will show that Equation (2) holds by
establishing a bijective correspondence between the executions in Execsθ(0),Obs
and Execsθ′(0),Obs. For brevity, we denote these sets by A and A
′.
First, we define a bijection f : A 7→ A′. For α ∈ A defined by the sequence
η(0), η(1), . . ., we define f(α)
∆
= θ′(0), (η′(0), x′(0), y′(0)), θ′(1), (η′(1), x′(1), y′(1)), θ′(2), . . .,
where for each t ∈ T,
η′i(t) =
{
ηi(t) + δ(1− σ)t for i = k,
ηi(t) otherwise.
x′(t) = θ′(t) + η′(t), y′(t) = 1N
∑
i∈[N ] x
′(t), and for t > 0 θ′(t) = (1− σ)θ′(t−
1) + σy′(t). Clearly, f(α) is a valid execution of the mechanism staring from
θ′(0).
The following proposition relates the states and the observable vectors of
two corresponding executions.
Proposition 2. For all t ∈ T, i ∈ [N ],
(i) θk(t)− θ′k(t) = δ(1− σ)t,
(ii) θi(t) = θ
′
i(t),∀i 6= k
(iii) x′i(t) = xi(t),
(iv) y′(t) = y(t).
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Proof. The proof is by induction on t. For the base case t = 0, observe that
for i = k, x′i(0) = θ
′
i(0) + η
′
i(0) = θi(0) − δ + ηi(0) + δ = xi(0), otherwise,
x′i(0) = θ
′
i(0) + η
′
i(0) = θi(0) + ηi(0) = xi(0);
For the inductive step, assume that the proposition holds for all t ≤ T . From
Equation 1, we have θ′k(T + 1) = (1 − σ)θ′k(T ) + σy′(T ) and θk(T + 1) = (1 −
σ)θk(T )+σy(T ). The difference of these two equation gives θ
′
k(T+1)−θk(T+1)
= (1− σ)(θ′k(T )− θk(T )) + σ(y′(T )− y(T ))
= (1− σ)(θ′k(T )− θk(T )) = δ(1− σ)T+1.
For any other client i 6= k, immediately from that y′(T ) = y(T ) and θ′i(T ) =
θi(T ), we have θi(T + 1) = θi(T + 1).
Now we consider the clients’ reports x(T+1). For the kth client, x′k(T+1) =
θ′k(T+1)+η
′
k(T+1) = θk(T+1)−δ(1−σ)T+1+ηk(T+1)+δ(1−σ)T+1 = xk(T+1).
For the other client i 6= k, x′i(T+1) = θ′i(T+1)+η′i(T+1) = θi(T+1)+ηi(T+1) =
xi(T + 1). So the reports x
′(T + 1) = x(T + 1). The match up of the server’s
internal state immediately follows.
Parts (iii) and (iv) of the above proposition establishes that α and f(α) are
indistinguishable, that is, indeed they produce the same observation sequence.
Next we will relate the probability of any finite prefix of an individual ex-
ecution α ∈ A, and its corresponding execution f(α) ∈ A′, for a particular
observation sequence β ∈ Obs:
Pr[αT = θ(0), . . . , θ(T )]
Pr[(f(α))T = θ(0), . . . , θ(T )]
=
T−1∏
t=0
∏
i∈[N ]
pL(η
′
i(t)|cqt)
pL(ηi(t)|cqt) =
T−1∏
t=0
pL(η
′
k(t)|cqt)
pL(ηk(t)|cqt)
≤
T−1∏
t=0
e
|η′k(t)−η
′
k(t)|
cqt =
T−1∏
t=0
e
δ
c (
1−σ
q )
t
.
Integrating over all executions α ∈ A, we get∫
α∈A
Pr[αT = θ(0), . . . , θ(T )]dµ
≤
T−1∏
t=0
e
δ
c (
1−σ
q )
t
∫
f(α)∈A′
Pr[(f(α))T = θ
′(0), . . . , θ′(T )]dµ′,
where dµ and dµ′ are probability measures over A and A′ defined by the ran-
domized mechanism. If q ∈ (1−σ, 1), then as T →∞, the product converges to
eδ, where  = qc(q+σ−1) , and we obtain the required inequality for -differential
privacy.
Pr[Execsθ(0),Obs] ≤ eδPr[Execsθ′(0),Obs].
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Lemma 3 (Convergence). The mechanism described above achieves conver-
gence.
Proof. We define a global potential function P : N→ R≥0 as P (t) = 12
∑
i 6=j [θi(t)−
θj(t)]
2. Using the matrix notation P (t) = θ(t)T L θ(t), where L ∈ RN×N with
elements:
l(i, j) =
{
N − 1, i = j,
−1, otherwise. (3)
The transition rule for the internal state of the ith client can be written as:
θi(t+ 1) = (1− σ)θi(t) + σN
∑N
i=1(θi(t) + ηi(t))
= (1 + σN − σ)θi(t) + σN
∑
j 6=i θj(t) +
σ
Nw(t),
(4)
where w(t) =
∑
i ηi(t). The update rule for all the agents can be written as
θ(t+ 1) = θ(t)− σNLθ(t) + σNw(t)1N . Then,
P (t+ 1) = θ(t+ 1)TLθ(t+ 1)
= [θ(t)− σNLθ(t) + σNw(t)1N ]TL
[θ(t)− σNLθ(t) + σNw(t)1N ]
= P (t)− 2 σN θ(t)TLLθ(t) + σ
2
N2 θ(t)
TLLLθ(t)
+2 σNw(t)θ(t)
TL1N − 2σ2N2 w(t)θ(t)TLL1N
+ σ
2
N2w(t)
2
1
T
NL1N .
= P (t)− 2 σN θ(t)TLLθ(t) + σ
2
N2 θ(t)
TLLLθ(t).
(5)
By Equation 3 we have L = NIN − 1NN . So in this particular case, we have
LL = (NIN − 1NN )2 = N2IN − 2N1NN + 12NN = N2IN − N1NN = NL.
Similarly LLL = N2L. Substitute the previous equation into Equation (5) we
get,
P (t+ 1) = (1− 2σ + σ2)P (t) = aP (t),
where a = (1− σ)2. For all σ ∈ (0, 1), a ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Thus we have as
t→∞, P (t) converges exponentially to 0, which implies convergence.
From Equation (4), each agent adds an identical random variable σNw(t) to
its local state in round t. Although the average value drifts with this random
variable, the relative distance between local states will not be affected. As a
result, the mechanism converges deterministically.
Lemma 4 (Accuracy). For any b ∈ (0, 1), the randomized mechanism achieves
(b,
√
2cσ√
bN(1−q2) ))-accuracy.
Proof. This is a special case of a more general proof we show later. Please see
the proof of Lemma 8 with d˜ = σ
2
N particularly for this case.
In this section we proposed an solution to the centralized synchronous con-
sensus problem and formally established its privacy, convergence and accuracy
properties. We will discuss the trade-offs between privacy and accuracy in Sec-
tion 5.
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4 A Distributed Mechanism
In this section, we present a second synchronous randomized mechanism for
solving the private consensus problem which does not use a server but instead
relies on the clients exchanging information with their neighbors in a truly
distributed fashion. Let G = ([N ],E) be a undirected connected graph, where
[N ] is the set of vertices and E ⊂ [N ]× [N ] is the set of edges. Let N(i) = {j ∈
[N ]|(i, j) ∈ E} be the set of neighbors of node i with whom it communicates.
Let |N(i)| be the degree of node i in G.
As in the previous setting, an intruder has access to all the communication
channels as well as the internal states of a set C of compromised clients (but
cannot overwrite them). Our mechanism will protect the privacy of clients
who are not compromised. Thus, in this context, Definition 5 is modified by
restricting the notion of δ-adjacency to uncompromised agents.
Now we state a mechanism to solve the distributed SPC problem. Besides the
state variable θi which holds the consensus value, client i holds another auxiliary
state yi. The mechanism has parameters σ ∈ (0, 1)N , c and q ∈ (0, 1). Instead
of sharing an identical linear combination factor, client i has an independent
σi ∈ (0, 1) which is the ith element of vector σ. At each round t ≥ 0:
(i) Client i sends a message xi(t) = θi(t)+ηi(t) to every j ∈ N(i), where ηi(t)
is a random noise generated from the distribution Lap(cqt).
(ii) Client i updates yi as the average of xi(t) and the messages it receives:
yi(t) =
1
|N(i)|+ 1
∑
j∈N(i)∪{i}
xj(t). (6)
(iii) Client i updates θi by linearly interpolating between θi(t) and yi(t) with
coefficient σi, that is,
θi(t+ 1) = (1− σi)θi(t) + σiyi(t). (7)
4.1 Analysis
The analysis of the distributed mechanism parallels the analysis presented in
Section 3. An execution α is defined similar to the centralized setting except
that y(t) in this case is a vector rather than a scaler. The privacy of those
corrupted nodes makes no sense. Let C ⊂ N be the set of corrupted nodes.
Lemma 5 (Privacy). For q ∈ (1−σm, 1), where σm is the minimum element of
vector σ, the distributed mechanism guarantees -differential privacy with respect
to the uncorrupted nodes with  = qc(q+σm−1) .
We omit the proof of Lemma 5 as it is a straight forward generalization of
the proof of Lemma 1.
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In contrast to Lemma 3, the convergence of the distributed mechanism de-
pends on the structure of graph G. Before stating the convergence result, we
introduce Laplacian matrix L of graph G with elements:
l(i, j) =
 |N(i)| i = j,−1 (i, j) ∈ E,
0 otherwise.
(8)
The Laplacian matrix L for any graph is known to have several nice properties.
It is by definition symmetric with real entries, hence it can be diagonalized by
an orthogonal matrix. It is positive semidefinite, hence its real eigenvalues can
be ordered as λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λN be the eigenvalues of L. Furthermore λ1 = 0
and λ2 > 0 if and only if the graph is connected. Let {v1, v2, . . . , vN} be a set
of orthonormal eigenvectors of L such that vk corresponds to λk. In addition,
denote di =
σi
|N(i)|+1 . We state a sufficient condition of convergence as following.
Assumption 1. Assume that graph G has the following properties.
(I) λ2 > 0, that is graph G is connected.
(II) λN <
M2
2m , where m = infi∈[N ] di and M = supi∈[N ] di.
Lemma 6 (Convergence). The distributed mechanism described above achieves
convergence if Assumption 1 holds.
Proof. We define a function P : N 7→ R≥0 as
P (t) =
1
2
∑
(i,j)∈E
[θi(t)− θj(t)]2.
Using the matrix notation P (t) = θ(t)T L θ(t). By Assumption 1, E[P (t)] =
0 ⇔∑i6=j E[θi(t)− θj(t)]2 = 0. According to Equation (6) and (7), the update
equation of client i is:
θi(t+ 1) = (1− di|N(i)|)θi(t) + di
∑
j∈N(i) θj(t)
+diwi(t),
(9)
where
wi(t) =
∑
j∈N(i)∪{i}
ηi(t). (10)
We define vector w(t) = [w1(t), . . . , wN (t)]
T and matrix D ∈ RN×N with ele-
ments:
d(i, j) =
{
di, i = j,
0, otherwise.
(11)
The update rule for all the agents can be written as θ(t+ 1) = θ(t)−DLθ(t) +
Dw(t). Then, P (t+ 1)
= θ(t+ 1)TLθ(t+ 1)
= (θ(t)−DLθ(t) +Dw(t))TL(θ(t)−DLθ(t) +Dw(t))
= P (t)− 2θ(t)TLDLθ(t) + θ(t)TLDLDLθ(t)+
2θ(t)T (I −DL)LDw(t) + w(t)TDLDw(t).
(12)
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Taking expectation of both sides with respect to the coin flips of the algorithm
starting from any state:
E[P (t+ 1)] = E[P (t)]− E[Q(θ(t))] + E[w(t)TDLDw(t)], (13)
where,
Q(θ) = 2θTLDLθ − θTLDLDLθ.
The term E[2θ(t)T (I − DL)LDw(t)] vanishes because (i) θ(t) and w(t) are
independent; and (ii) by Equation (10), w(t) has zero mean.
Now we will prove that there exists a constant a ∈ (0, 1) such that Q(θ(t)) ≥
aP (t). Because L is positive semidefinite, we have 0 ≤ L ≤ λNI. From As-
sumption 1 and Equation (11), we have mI ≤ D ≤MI. Then,
Q(θ) ≥ 2mθTLLθ − λNθTLDDLθ
≥ 2mθTLLθ − λNM2θTLLθ
≥ (2m− λNM2)θTLLθ.
(14)
The following proposition helps obtain a bound on a.
Proposition 7. For any θ ∈ RN , θTLLθ ≥ λ2θTLθ.
Proof. First, we show that the proposition holds for any eigenvector vk of L.
For the eigenvector v1 corresponding to λ1 = 0, we have v
T
1 L = 0 and the
inequality holds trivially. For any other eigenvector vk and the corresponding
eigenvalue λk > 0, we have v
T
k LLvk = λkv
T
k Lvk ≥ λ2vTk Lvk. Next, we prove
that the proposition holds for any vector θ. Because {v1, v2, . . . , vN} is an
orthonormal basis, for any i 6= j, vTi LLvj = λjvTi Lvj = λ2jvTi vj = 0. For any
θ =
∑
k∈[N ] αkvk, we have:
θTLLθ = (
∑
k∈[N ] αkvk)
TLL(
∑
k∈[N ] αkvk)
=
∑
k∈[N ] α
2
kv
T
k LLvk
≥ λ2
∑
k∈[N ] α
2
kv
T
k Lvk = λ2θ
TLθ.
From Equation (14), then it follows that
Q(θ(t)) ≥ λ2(2m− λNM2)P (t).
Thus, for any a ≤ min(λ2(2m − λNM2), 1), the inequality Q(θ(t)) ≥ aP (t)
holds. Also, by Assumption 1, λ2(2m− λNM2) > 0. Then, for some a ∈ (0, 1),
Equation (13) is reduced to
E[P (t+ 1)] ≤ (1− a)E[P (t)] + E[w(t)TDLDw(t)]
≤ (1− a)E[P (t)] + λNM2E[w(t)Tw(t)].
As t → ∞ the contribution of the first term converges to 0. For the second
term, recall that each element of w(t) is a linear combination of i.i.d ηi(t) ∼
Lap(cqt). For i 6= j, E[ηi(t)ηj(t)] = E[ηi(t)]E[ηj(t)] = 0. For any i, E[ηi(t)2] =
V ar(ηi(t)) = 2c
2q2t, which also converges to 0. So E[w(t)Tw(t)]→ 0 as t→∞.
Combining, we have E[P (t)]→ 0 as t→∞.
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In general, the expected consensus value of the distributed algorithm does
not coincide with the initial average. Intuitively, a node with higher degree or
slower evolution will have heavier weight on the consensus value. In this context,
Definition 4 is modified by replacing the average θ¯(0) = 1N
∑
i θi(0) with a
weighted modification θ¯(0) =
∑
i γiθi(0)∑
i γi
, where the weight γi =
1
di
= |N(i)|+1σi .
Lemma 8 (accuracy). The distributed mechanism achieves (b,
√
2d˜c√
b(1−q2) )-accuracy,
where d˜ =
∑
i(|N(i)|+1)2
(
∑
i γi)
2 .
Proof. Let us fix an initial state θ(0) and define θ¯(t) =
∑
i γiθi(t)∑
i γi
and w˜(t) =∑
i wi∑
i γi
. We rewrite Equation (9) with
γiθi(t+ 1) = γiθi(t)− |N(i)|θi(t) +
∑
j∈N(i)
θj(t) + wi(t).
Add up all N equations and divided by
∑
i γi, we get:
θ¯(t+ 1) = θ¯(t) + w˜(t) = θ¯(0) +
t∑
s=0
w˜(s).
From the definition of w˜(t) and Equation (10), we have
V ar(w˜(t)) =
V ar(
∑
i wi(t))
(
∑
i γi)
2
=
V ar(
∑
i(|N(i)|+ 1)ηi(t))
(
∑
i γi)
2
=
V ar(ηi(t))
∑
i(|N(i)|+ 1)2
(
∑
i γi)
2
= 2d˜c2q2t.
By q ∈ (0, 1), the series converges.
V ar(
t∑
s=0
w˜(s)) ≤ V ar(
∞∑
s=0
w˜(s)) =
2d˜c2
1− q2 .
By Chebyshev’s inequality for any t ≥ 0:
Pr(|θ¯(t)− θ¯(0)| ≤ r) = 1− Pr(|
t∑
s=0
w(s)| > r) ≥ 1− V ar(
∑t
s=0 w(s))
r2
.
Choosing r =
√
V ar(
∑t
s=0 w(s))√
b
=
√
2d˜c√
bN(1−q2) , we have 1 − Pr(|
∑t
s=0 w(s)| >
r) ≥ 1 − b. Let t → ∞, by Lemma 6 every execution converges. Then the
lemma follows.
The trade-off between accuracy and privacy of this mechanism is similar to
that of the client-server mechanism of Section 3 and we discuss them together
next.
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5 Discussion on Results
We proposed two mechanisms that achieve iterative private consensus over in-
finite horizon by adding a stream of noises to the messages set by the clients
(to each other or to the server). The standard deviation of the Laplace distri-
bution of the noise added in every round decreases and ultimately converges to
Lap(0) which is the Dirac δ distribution at 0. The mechanisms have 3 param-
eters: linear combination factor σ, initial noise c and noise convergence rate q.
The constraint to achieve privacy over infinite horizon is that q > 1− σ, which
roughly means that the noise should converge slower than the system’s inertia
so as to “cover” the trail of dynamics.
From Lemma 1 and 5 we observe that  decreases with larger c or q. This
implies that the system has a higher privacy if the noise values are picked from
a Laplace distribution with larger parameters (and hence larger standard devi-
ation). From Lemma 4 and 8, however, a more dispersive noise results in worse
accuracy. The tradeoff between privacy and accuracy for different noise conver-
gent rate (q) is illustrated in Figure 1. If we fix the parameter q, we observe that
for -differential privacy for N agents and an accuracy level of b the accuracy
radius r is O( 1

√
βN
). For specific values on these parameters, the dependence
between  and r is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Privacy and Accuracy as functions of the Noise convergent rate in
the centralized mechanism. Parameterized with N = 500, σ = 0.8, c = 10 and
β = 0.5.
6 Related Work
Our consensus mechanism has similarities with the protocols for computing sum
and inner product presented in [1], in that, all these protocols rely on adding
noise to the states communicated among the participants. Our mechanism dif-
fers in the type of noise (geometrically decaying Laplace) that is added. More-
over, in our setup, the computed outputs are used as feedback for updating the
state of the participants to achieve convergence.
In [7] a framework for securely computing general types of aggregates is
presented. Every client splits its private data into pieces and sends them to
different servers. If at least one server is not compromised, then the iterative
aggregate computation is guaranteed to preserve privacy of the individuals. Our
mechanism is quite different and it guarantees privacy even if the only server is
compromised.
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In [25], the authors present distributed protocols for computing k maxi-
mum values among all participants. In this protocol, the clients communicate
a global vector of k-maximum values over a ring network. In each step, the
client processing the global vector either with an exponential decaying prob-
ability honestly replaces the values in global state if it is smaller than one of
the local values, or it replaces the values in the vector with randomly generated
small numbers. The metric of privacy is Loss of Privacy which characterizes
the additional knowledge to the adversary of gaining intermediate result besides
the final results. This work is setup with quite different definition of privacy
compare to ours. In addition, some features of our mechanism, such as feedback
update and infinite horizon, are not presented in this protocol.
7 Conclusions and Future direction
In this paper, we formalize a Synchronized Private Consensus problem and pro-
pose two mechanisms for solving it. The first one relies on the client-server
model of communication and the latter is purely distributed. The key idea is to
add a random noise to the clients’ messages to the server (or other clients) that
is drawn from a Laplace distribution that converges to the Dirac distribution.
The messages with large noice give differential privacy and as the noise level at-
tenuates, the system converges to the target value with probability that depends
inversely on the security parameter and directly in the number of participants.
The feedback y(t) from the server is the mean of all noisy messages sent. And,
the clients update their states by taking a linear combination of y(t) and their
previous state. We formally prove the privacy and convergence of this mech-
anism. The key proof technique for privacy, relies on constructing a bijective
map between two sets of executions starting from different but adjacent initial
states.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first investigation of differential
privacy in the context of control systems where the ultimate goal is convergence.
Our results suggest several directions for future work. First, we are trying to
apply our method to a larger set of control problems that arise from iterative
closed-loop control. Novel applications of this arise from differential privacy and
more generally security of distributed cyber-physical systems where the physical
state is updated smoothly according to some differential equations.
Second, we also interested in exploring the tradeoff between privacy and
performance under more general dynamics of the system. In the SPC problem
we discussed, the dynamics of the system is discrete and linear. We expect to
extend the analysis to continuous or non-linear systems. Also, establishing a
lower bound for the problem will be of significance.
An orthogonal direction is to develop automated verification and synthesis
algorithms for controllers that preserve differential privacy. Along these lines,
a verification framework for streaming algorithms has been presented in [2, 20].
The challenge will be to extend these ideas to synthesis and feedback control
systems.
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